  

THE COURT AFFECTS
EACH OF US
THE SUPREME COURT TERM IN REVIEW

A

Erwin Chemerinsky†

OCTOBER TERM 2012 powerfully shows that
Supreme Court decisions affect each of us, often in the
most important and intimate aspects of our lives. On
Wednesday, June 26, the Supreme Court dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds the case involving California’s Proposition 8
and two days later same sex couples began marrying in California.1
The decisions of this term will affect who gets into college, when
the government can take our DNA, what federal benefits married
same-sex couples can receive, what voting systems are used and thus
who gets elected, and whether injured individuals can successfully
sue businesses.
Once more, it was the Anthony Kennedy Court. Justice Kennedy
was in the majority more than any other justice: 91% of the time.2
But it is the 5-4 decisions where Kennedy’s influence is best seen.
Out of 73 cases decided after briefing and oral argument, 23 were
5-4. Kennedy was in the majority in 20 of the 23. Antonin Scalia
was second most often in the majority in 5-4 cases, but in only 13 of
them.
†
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It therefore is possible to get the clearest overall sense of the
ideology of the term by focusing on the 16 cases that were ideologically divided 5-4 along familiar lines, with John Roberts, Scalia,
Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito on one side and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan on
the other. Kennedy was with the conservatives in ten and with the
liberals in six of these cases.
So what were some of the more important cases of the term and
what will they mean?3

N

I. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

o decision was more eagerly anticipated than Fisher v. University
of Texas on the constitutionality of affirmative action by colleges and universities.4 The case was argued on Wednesday, October
10, but not decided until Monday, June 24. At first reading, the
decision seemed to do very little. Supporters of affirmative action
breathed a huge sigh of relief that the Court did not change the law,
at most clarified it, and remanded the case for further consideration.
In June 2003, in Grutter v. Bollinger,5 the Supreme Court held 5-4
that colleges and universities have a compelling interest in having a
3
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5

Of course, a 5,000-word essay can cover only some of the cases of the term.
Other important cases not discussed here included: Alleyne v. United States, 133
S.Ct. 2151 (2013) (the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury requires a jury to
determine facts that increase a mandatory minimum sentence); Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013) (naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent-eligible merely because it has been isolated, but complementary DNA (cDNA) is patent-eligible
because it is not naturally occurring); Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133
S.Ct. 1138 (2013) (challenge to possible electronic surveillance of those in the
United States under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act dismissed for lack of
standing because plaintiffs could not show that their conversations were intercepted or likely to be intercepted); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District, 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2013) (the government’s demand for property from a
land-use permit applicant must satisfy the Nollan/Dolan requirements even when
it denies the permit).
133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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diverse student body and that they may use race as one factor among
many in their admissions decisions. In 2004, the Regents of the University of Texas realized that they had a less diverse student body
than existed in 1996. A new admissions plan was adopted.
Under it, about 75 percent of the entering class was taken from
the top ten percent of high schools across the state. Texas is sufficiently racially segregated that this will produce some racial diversity. The other 25 percent of the class was taken by calculating an
admissions score for each student. The score was the sum of two
numbers: an academic achievement index, which was the applicant’s
grades and test scores, and a personal achievement index, which was
arrived at by grading two essays and looking at six factors, one of
which was diversity.
Abigail Fisher applied for the University of Texas in 2008 and
was rejected. She enrolled at Louisiana State University, from which
she graduated in 2012. After being rejected, she brought a lawsuit
against the University of Texas challenging its use of race as denying
equal protection. The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit
ruled in favor of the University of Texas, saying that it had followed
Grutter and had permissibly used race as one factor among many in
its admissions decisions.
The Supreme Court granted review. I strongly believe that the
Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Fisher expressly
acknowledged to the Court that she no longer has claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. She graduated from college and is not going again. She is the only plaintiff in the lawsuit and her only remaining claim is for $100, her application fee. The defendants in the
lawsuit are the University of Texas and its regents, sued in their official capacity. But the law is clear that the Eleventh Amendment
bars suits for money damages against a state or its officials in their
official capacity.6 Moreover, to have standing a plaintiff must show
that his or her injury is caused by the unconstitutional policy.7 Fisher’s loss of $100 was not caused by the affirmative action plan.
6
7

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction (6th ed. 2012) 438.
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Inexplicably, the Court ignored these jurisdictional issues (they
were raised in a footnote in the University of Texas’s brief).8 In a 71 decision, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. Justice Kennedy wrote for the
Court. Only Justice Ginsburg dissented. Justice Kagan was recused.
Kennedy wrote that the Court was not reconsidering Grutter and
its holding that colleges and universities have a compelling interest
in having a diverse student body. The Court said, though, that Grutter established that any use of race in admissions must meet strict
scrutiny and thus must be shown to be necessary to achieve a compelling interest. The Court said that it is not enough to have a compelling interest in achieving diversity; a college or university also
must show that the use of race is necessary to achieve it.
Kennedy wrote that there must be a “careful judicial inquiry into
whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using
racial classifications.”9 In crucial language, he said: “The reviewing
Court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral
alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity. If a
nonracial approach . . . could promote the substantial interest about
as well and at tolerable administrative expense, then the university
may not consider race.” But the Court also said that this “does not
require exhaustion of every conceivable race neutral alternative.”10
In one sense, this did not change the law concerning affirmative
action. The Court reaffirmed Grutter: colleges and universities have
a compelling interest in having a diverse student body, but must
meet strict scrutiny in using race as a factor in admissions decisions.
In another sense, though, Fisher adopts a tougher, less sympathetic tone when it comes to affirmative action programs. For example,
in Grutter, the Court spoke of the need to defer to the judgment of
colleges and universities. In Fisher, the Court said that such deference was appropriate only as to the importance of diversity; there is
no deference to given as to whether race is necessary to achieve it.
8

Brief for Respondents, Fisher v. University of Texas, Austin, at 16-17 (fn. 6).
133 S.Ct. at 2420.
10
Id.
9
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Kennedy declared: “The University must prove that the means chosen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that
goal. On this point, the University receives no deference.”11
Fisher leaves open many crucial questions, which will need to be
litigated on remand (unless the lower court dismisses, as it should,
for lack of jurisdiction) and in challenges to other affirmative action
plans. Colleges and universities use race to gain diversity precisely
because other alternatives don’t achieve racial diversity.
But what kind of evidence is required to show that race neutral
alternatives are insufficient to achieve diversity? Must each institution compile its own evidence and how much evidence is required?
In fact, it even is unclear as to what qualifies as a “race neutral”
alternative. For example, is a top ten percent plan – a state university taking the top ten percent of graduates from around the state –
race neutral? Ginsburg makes the point in her dissent that top ten
percent plans are adopted with the intent of creating racial diversity
and have that effect.12 A government action taken with the intent
and impact of using race is treated as a racial classification under
equal protection. In fact, any proxy for race that is done with the
purpose and effect of using race is a racial classification.
Nor does the Court offer any guidance about what “diversity”
means. In Grutter, the Court recognized that there must be a “critical
mass” of minority students to attract them to attend and to provide
the benefits of diversity. One of the key issues raised in the briefs
and oral arguments in Fisher was how to determine what is sufficient
for a “critical mass.” The Court did not address that issue.

II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

T

A. Fourth Amendment
his was a big year for the Fourth Amendment in the Supreme
Court, with five decisions.13 Two – Florida v. Jardines14 and Mary-

11

Id.
Id. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13
The other Fourth Amendment cases were: Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050
12
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land v. King15 – are especially important for what they say about the
Court’s approach to the Fourth Amendment. In the former, the
Court ruled that it is a search under the Fourth Amendment for a
police officer to take a drug-sniffing dog onto the front porch of a
home without the consent of the homeowner. Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority in a 5-4 decision, held that taking the dog onto the
property was a trespass and that was sufficient for it to be a search.
In Maryland v. King, the Court held, 5-4 with Justice Kennedy
writing for the majority, that it did not violate the Fourth Amendment for the police to routinely take DNA from those arrested for
serious crimes, if the DNA is taken for the purpose of helping to
solve other crimes for which the individual is not a suspect. The
Court, stressing that the police action was reasonable because the
benefits to law enforcement outweighed the invasion of privacy,
likened this to taking fingerprints from those arrested.
Beyond limiting dog sniffs at homes and approving taking DNA
from arrestees, these cases show the failure of the Court to deal
with a crucial underlying issue: when should the police be able to
gather information about an individual, whether it is about what is
going on in the home or from the person’s DNA, without a warrant
and probable cause? Informational privacy is the key question in a
society where it is increasingly easy for police to gather information
about people and their activities. Neither case focused on this.16

(2013) (use of a police dog to establish probable cause does not required detailed
evidence establishing its reliability); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013)
(there are not inherently exigent circumstances justifying warrantless taking of
blood without consent in all driving-under-the-influence cases); United States v.
Bailey, 133 S.Ct. 1031 (2013) (police cannot detain an individual who is not at
home incident to a search of the home).
14
133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013).
15
133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013).
16
In a concurring opinion in Jardines, Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor, urged a privacy based approach, rather than one focusing on property
and trespass. 133 S.Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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A

B. Fifth Amendment

person cannot invoke the right to remain silent by being silent
and not responding to police questions. That seemingly oxymoronic statement was the holding in Salinas v. Texas.17 The result is
that unless a person explicitly invokes the right to remain silent in
the face of police questioning before an arrest, prosecutors can use
that silence as evidence of guilt at trial. The bottom line is that criminal defense lawyers should advise their clients to be explicit that
they are invoking their right to remain silent whenever they wish to
refuse to answer police questions.
Genovevo Salinas was questioned by the police in connection
with a double murder. He was not under arrest and voluntarily answered questions from the police. He had turned over his shotgun
and for most of the hour-long interview with the police officers responded to their questions, but when asked whether his shotgun
“would match the shells recovered at the scene of the murder,” Salinas declined to answer.
When Salinas was prosecuted for the murders, the prosecutor
used evidence of his silence in response to the police questions as
evidence of his guilt. He was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in
prison.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, without a majority opinion, held that there had not been a violation of Salinas’s privilege
against self-incrimination. Justice Alito wrote the plurality opinion,
which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. The
plurality said that the privilege against self-incrimination must be
expressly invoked and Salinas never did that.
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice
Scalia, and would have gone much further: he would have overruled
the long-standing Supreme Court decision which held that prosecutors cannot use a defendant’s silence as evidence of guilt. In Griffin v.
California,18 the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege
17
18

133 S.Ct. 2174 (2013).
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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against self-incrimination prohibits a prosecutor or judge from negatively commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify.
Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. He stressed that the Court long
has held that “no ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke
the privilege,”19 and that in the context of the questioning of Salinas,
his silence was likely intended to avoid answering questions that
might incriminate him. Although not under arrest, he was questioned at the police station and was told that he was a suspect in the
murders. Breyer said that the issue in any case should be “whether
one can fairly infer that the individual being questioned is invoking
the Amendment’s protection.”20
The case is troubling because it is so divorced from reality. Most
people don’t know that they have the right to remain silent when
questioned by police during an investigation. And certainly most are
unlikely to know that even if they have such a right, they must explicitly say, “I wish to invoke my right to remain silent.” Although
the plurality does not specify any magic words that must be uttered,
it seems fairly close to that because the suspect must unambiguously
and expressly invoke the right to remain silent.
There is a profound irony to the plurality’s approach: exercising
the right to remain silent by being silent is not sufficient to invoke
that right. A defendant must speak in order to claim that right and
likely must do so with exactly the type of “ritualistic formula” that
the Court has previously rejected. Constitutional protections should
not be just for those who have legal training and know what they
need to say to the police to invoke their rights.

T

III. VOTING RIGHTS

he Voting Rights Act of 1965 is one of the most important federal laws adopted in my lifetime. Section 2 prohibits state and
local governments from having election practices or systems that
discriminate against minority voters. Lawsuits can be brought to
19
20

Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
133 S.Ct. at 2189 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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enforce it. But Congress believed that this was not sufficient to stop
discrimination in voting. Congress knew that litigation is expensive
and time consuming. Congress also knew that some states – especially Southern states – had the practice of continually changing
their voting systems to disenfranchise minority voters.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides that jurisdictions
with a history of race discrimination in voting may change their
election systems only if they get “preclearance” from the Attorney
General or a three-judge federal district court. Section 4(b) of the
Act defines those jurisdictions which must get preclearance: nine
states and many local governments with a history of race discrimination in voting.
Each time the law was about to expire, Congress extended it.
Most recently, the law was set to expire in 2007 and Congress held
12 hearings over an 11-month period and produced a record of
15,000 pages. The Senate voted 98-0 to extend the law for another
25 years and there were only 33 no votes in the House of Representatives. President George W. Bush signed the extension into law.
In Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, the Court, 5-4, held Section
4(b) unconstitutional and thereby also effectively nullified Section 5
because it applies only to jurisdictions covered under Section 4(b).21
It is the first time since the 19th century that the Court has declared
unconstitutional a federal civil rights statute. Chief Justice Roberts
wrote for the Court and stressed that the formula in Section 4(b)
rests on data from the 1960s and the 1970s. He said that it was an
intrusion on state and local sovereignty to require that they “beseech” the Attorney General to approve their election systems.
Roberts said that it violated a principle of equal state sovereignty to
treat the states differently with regard to the requirement for preclearance.
Roberts’s opinion was puzzling because the constitutional basis
for the decision was not clear. What part of the Constitution did
Section 4(b) violate? What level of scrutiny was the Court using?
What is the constitutional basis for the principle of equal sovereign21

133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).
SUMMER 2013

369

Erwin Chemerinsky
ty? None of these questions was addressed by the Court.
In theory, Congress can enact a new version of Section 4(b)
based on contemporary data. In reality, it is hard to imagine Congress being able to ever agree on a new formula to require that
some of jurisdictions and not others get preclearance. Moreover, it
would seem that any formula which treats some states differently
from others would violate the Court’s principle of equal state sovereignty. The effect likely will be a significant increase in litigation
under Section 2 and also many election systems going into place that
otherwise would have been rejected because of their impact on minority voters.

I

IV. MARRIAGE EQUALITY

n two decisions on Wednesday, June 26, the Supreme Court significantly expanded the right to marriage equality for gays and
lesbians. In United States v. Windsor,22 the Court invalidated Section 3
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which provided that for
purposes of federal law, marriage had to be between a man and a
woman. The result is that same-sex couples who are lawfully married
in the 13 states which now allow this will receive benefits that are
accorded to married couples under more than 1,000 federal laws.
In Hollingsworth v. Perry,23 the Court dismissed the litigation concerning California’s Proposition 8, which had amended the State’s
constitution to provide that marriage must be between a man and a
woman.
Although the Court’s decisions were limited to those laws, the
implications are enormous. Simply put, the Court took a major step
towards a right to marriage equality for gays and lesbians in the
United States.
In Windsor, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, declared Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy wrote for the
Court and his opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Kennedy began by addressing the issue of ju22
23

133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013).
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risdiction. Since the Obama administration agreed with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that Section 3 of DOMA is
unconstitutional, could it seek Supreme Court review? The Court
found that there was jurisdiction because there was a continuing
dispute between the United States and Edith Windsor over whether
she was owed a refund of the $363,053 in estate taxes she had paid
on her inheritance from her deceased partner. The Court concluded: “Windsor’s ongoing claim for funds that the United States refuses to pay thus establishes a controversy sufficient for Article III jurisdiction.”24 The Court found that the “sharp adversarial presentation of the issues” by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG)
of the House of Representatives “satisfies the prudential concerns
that otherwise might counsel against hearing an appeal from a decision with which the principal parties agree.”25
The Court then reached the merits and found that Section 3 of
DOMA denies equal protection to gays and lesbians. The Court began by noting that marriage has traditionally been defined by the
states. The Court said that “DOMA seeks to injure the very class
New York seeks to protect. By doing so it violates basic due process
and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.”26 The Court explained that DOMA is unconstitutional because it was based on an impermissible desire to disadvantage gays
and lesbians. Kennedy quoted the House Report on DOMA, which
said the Act was based on “both moral disapproval of homosexuality,
and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with
traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.”27
The Supreme Court earlier held that the government cannot
base a law on disapproval of homosexuality.28 Such animus is not a
legitimate government purpose sufficient to justify a discriminatory
statute.
24

133 S.Ct. at 2686.
Id. at 2688.
26
Id. at 2693.
27
Id. at 2693.
28
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
25
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Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito each wrote a
dissenting opinion. The dissents argued that the Court should have
dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds and strongly disagreed
with the Court’s invalidation of Section 3 of DOMA. Each urged
deference to Congress’s judgment to prohibit same sex marriage.
The irony is that none of these justices felt any need to defer to
Congress when striking down a key provision of the Voting Rights
Act in Shelby County.
Hollingsworth v. Perry involved a California initiative which
banned same-sex marriages. In May 2008, the California Supreme
Court interpreted the California Constitution to create a right of
marriage equality for gays and lesbians. To overturn this decision, in
November 2008, California voters passed Proposition 8, which
amended the California Constitution to say that marriage had to be
between a man and a woman.
Two same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8. In the
summer of 2010, federal district court Judge Vaughn Walker declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional because it violated the fundamental right to marry and denied equal protection to gays and lesbians. The defendants in the lawsuit, including the Governor, the Attorney General, and the Registrar of Records, decided not to appeal
Walker’s ruling. Supporters of Proposition 8 intervened to appeal.
After briefing and oral argument, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme Court the
question of whether under California law the supporters of an initiative have standing to appeal when state officials refuse to do so. The
California Supreme Court said that the supporters of an initiative
could represent the interests of the state to ensure that an initiative
is defended in court.29 The Ninth Circuit, in February 2012, then
found that the supporters of the initiative had standing to appeal and
declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional.

29

Perry v. Brown, 52 Cal.4th 1116, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 499, 265 P.3d 1002 (2011).
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The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed and vacated the
Ninth Circuit’s decision. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court
that the supporters of an initiative lack standing to appeal to defend
it when government officials refuse to do so. His opinion was joined
by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. The Court explained that standing to bring a suit or appeal requires that there be
an injury. Those who support an initiative suffer only an ideological
injury if it is enjoined and an ideological injury is never sufficient for
standing. The result is that the federal district court decision invalidating Proposition 8 stands.
In practical effect, these decisions are very important. Gay and
lesbian couples who are married will get federal benefits previously
reserved for heterosexual couples. Gay and lesbian couples are now
marrying in California, making it the thirteenth and largest state to
permit this.
The Supreme Court was explicit that it was declaring only Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional and not ruling on any other law
denying marriage equality. But the Court’s reasoning will have significant implications for laws denying marriage equality for gays and
lesbians. For example, Section 2 of DOMA, which says that no state
must recognize a same-sex marriage from another state, is almost
surely unconstitutional after the Court’s decision in Windsor. Kennedy said that DOMA is unconstitutional because it was based on
impermissible hostility to gays and lesbians. This would seem to
make all of it unconstitutional, including Section 2.
The next major wave of litigation will be challenges to state laws
that prohibit same-sex marriage. In his vehement dissent, Scalia said
that there is no way to distinguish these statutes from Section 3 of
DOMA and it is just a matter of waiting for the other shoe to drop.
After Windsor’s conclusion that no legitimate government purpose is served by denying gays and lesbians the right to marry, it is
difficult to see how the Court will uphold any law prohibiting samesex marriage. Those who oppose same-sex marriage will argue that
the language about federalism in Kennedy’s opinion supports the
ability of states to decide, including to ban same-sex marriage. But
the holding in Windsor was that Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutionSUMMER 2013
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ally denied equal protection to gays and lesbians. Its reasoning, that
the failure to recognize same-sex marriages is based on animus and
serves no legitimate purpose, will be the basis for challenging state
laws throughout the country. It seems only a matter of a short time
before this gets back to the Supreme Court and it appears that there
are five votes – Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan
– to strike down such laws.

I

V. BUSINESS LITIGATION

n a number of important decisions, the Supreme Court ruled in
favor of businesses and made it more difficult for those injured to
sue. In Mutual Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Bartlett,30 the Court ruled, 5-4,
that makers of generic drugs could not be sued for design defects.
Two years ago, in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,31 the Court ruled that makers of generic drugs cannot be sued on a failure to warn theory. In
these two cases, the Court said that under federal law, generic drugs
can be sold if they are identical to brand-name drugs and if they have
the warning label approved for the brand-name drugs. The Court
said this precludes a generic drug company from changing the chemical compound or the warning label, so no lawsuits can be brought
for failure to do so.
According to the Food and Drug Administration, almost 80 % of
all prescriptions are filled with generic drugs. If there is a generic
equivalent to the brand name drug, over 90% of prescriptions are
filled with the generic drug. Those injured by generic drugs, even
severely, likely are without a remedy.
In two employment discrimination cases, both 5-4, the Court
made it much more difficult for employees who bring such claims.
In Vance v. Ball State University,32 the Court made it harder for employees suing for workplace harassment. In recent years the Court
has held that an employer can be held liable for harassment by a fellow employee only if the employer is proven to be negligent in con30

133 S.Ct. 2466 (2013).
131 S.Ct. 2567 (2011).
32
133 S.Ct. 2434 (2013).
31
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trolling the workplace.33 If the harasser is a supervisor and the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action,
the employer is strictly liable. But if no tangible employment action
is taken, the employer may escape liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) the plaintiff
unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective
opportunities that the employer provided.
In Vance, the Court adopted a narrow definition of who is a supervisor, limiting it to those employees who have been empowered
by their employer to take an adverse employment action, such as the
power to “hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline” the
employee bringing the harassment claim. This will mean that in
many more cases an employee can recover for harassment only by
proving negligence by the employer.
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,34 the
Court made it more difficult for employees to successfully sue for
claims that they were retaliated against for complaining of discrimination. Generally, a plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit
need only show that the prohibited grounds, such as race or gender,
were a motivating factor for the adverse employment action. The
Court has prescribed a method of analysis for such “mixed motive”
claims.35
But in Nassar, the Court ruled that the retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and similarly worded provisions in other federal statutes, requires a plaintiff to prove that an
employer would not have taken the adverse employment action but
for the desire to retaliate. This requirement of “but-for causation”
likely will mean that many more of such claims will be resolved in
favor of employers at the summary judgment stage.
Finally, in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant,36 a small
33

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
34
133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013).
35
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
36
133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013).
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business sought to bring a class action against American Express for
alleged antitrust violations. American Express moved to prevent this
litigation by invoking a clause in its agreement with Italian Colors
requiring individual, and not class-wide, arbitration. The Court said
that an arbitration clause in a contract must be enforced even if it
means that the antitrust suit realistically would not go forward.
Italian Colors said that the suit simply could not go forward except as a class action. Successfully suing for an antitrust violation
costs hundreds of thousands if not millions of dollars. Recovery for a
claim under the antitrust law, though, is limited to $39,000. The
Court, 5-4, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, said that the Federal Arbitration Act required that the arbitration clause be strictly enforced, even if it meant that the antitrust claims otherwise would
not be brought. As in ATT Mobility LLC v. Concepcion two years ago,37
the Court’s conservative majority required enforcement of an arbitration clause even though it would likely completely immunize the
defendant from liability for illegal conduct.

O

CONCLUSION

ctober Term 2012 was filled with blockbuster cases and next
term promises to be more of the same. The Court already has
cases on the docket concerning abortion rights, affirmative action,
campaign finance, separation of church and state, separation of
powers, and freedom of speech. It is an amazing time in the United
States Supreme Court.

37

131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
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